鄉(xiāng)鎮(zhèn)人大公共預(yù)算監(jiān)督
宋揚
2007年07月18日 11:12
From a Little Spark may Set the Prairie Ablaze
---A Case Study of the Reform on Public Budget in the Town of Xinhe and the Revelation
By GUO Yedan & GUO Dan
Guo Yedan is a student at Arabic department, Beijing International Studies University (yedan_1@hotmail.com; +86-13811952878)
Guo Dan is a professor, chief director of the Institute of Politics, Sichuan Academy of Social Science (SASS)
(yedanba@163.com ; +86-13908171854)
June 2007
Key words:
Public Fiscal Budget, Democratic Talkfest, People’s Congress, CPC, China’s Political Reform
Abstract:
It is puzzling why China has been keeping fast economic growth and a comparably stable social order with an unchanging one-party leadership after 1989, when the whole world is convinced that China would be taken over by oncoming “peaceful evolution” as a “wasteland of democracy”. No doubt that China has unique approach to efficient governance, however, on the other hand, unlike North Korea, it has been constantly trying to promote democratic course.
According the constitution, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) is supposed to occupy a dominant role in the area of legislation. However it seems tough for the deputies to the people’s congress to wield their power to supervise government because of the significant complexity of the relationship between NPC and Communist Party of China (CPC), which has formed an ingrained shape since 1949.
Since the economic reform from early 1980’s, the functional transformation of the government and the relation between CPC and NPC has been gradually put on agenda. Meanwhile, grassroots democracy has experienced impressively fast progress in China. It is as well considered a touchstone of China’s political reform. The splendid rural area of China has experienced the these magnificent institutional changes, and it is still positioned on the forefront of this prolonged transformation.
1999, the standing committee of 9th National People’s congress has passed the Wenling County is located in the eastern province of Zhejiang, a leading province of dynamic economic strength. Eight years ago (1999), the local government started to organize “democratic talkfest” (minzhu kentan), in which people from different communities were invited to join the talkfest to discuss on economic issues and policies them concern. Several years afterwards, in the year of 2005, in Xinhe, a town under the administrative jurisdiction of Wenling County, “Democratic talkfest” (minzhu kentan) has been for the first time applied to public budget. Based on newspaper reports, released government documents, and telephone interviews with local deputies, we estimate how such a form of discussion and follow-up actions impact on local government’s decisions and its budgeting plans and the further revelation of this case to China’s political reform.
This paper concludes that reform in the town of Xinhe goes well. And since the reform touching upon public budget, it is undeniably a touchstone of further political reform in present-day China. However challenges exist in specific fields, since forms like “democratic talkfest” minzhu kentan) are lack of essential institutional guarantee so as to ensure its execution. Most important is that the experiment in Xinhe town provides us a new perspective to look into the core part in China’s democratic political construction: to coordinate the power correlation among the party, people’s congress and government. In present political system, the status of CPC is steady, yet the way to wield its power is variable. Therefore we suppose a new approach to exercise power: “double as both secretary of local party committee and director of people’s congress standing committee at corresponding level” on the premise of power structural reorganization.
BACKGROUND
During the process of modernization, the social environment is constantly changing, which will inevitably break the primary social balance. When the political system is no longer suited to the social environment, it has to be rectified to satisfy the majority, in order to maintain social stability.
Since the economic reform and opening in 1978, China’s economy has steam onto a fast lane with a GDP growth at an average rate of nearly 9% per year. High speed of economic growth brought with rapid increase of social wealth. In the same time in the aftermath of the reform in economic system, the limit on current political structure has emerged, the previous governance of CPC adapted to wartime and planned economy disharmonizes the political environment with the soaring economic development. The planned economy mainly depends on the support of state’s administrative power while the market economy is based on laws and regulations in which the subjects of market operate in a normative way. Obviously, therefore, the reform on political system is necessary to fit the market-oriented economic reform.
As the only party in power with supreme authority, CPC has commenced exploration of its substantial transformation from “revolutionary party” to “governing party” since the establishment of socialist system in mainland China in 1956. “Revolutionary party comes into power by sword; governing party comes into power by ballot. Now that CPC has changed its role, people’s congress should be the real “arena” of CPC”. (Huang Ji, 2006)[i]. CPC is actually taking control of NPC although NPC has been constitutionally stipulated as the organ of supreme power of PRC. As the consequence of rising voice for political structural reform, CPC has been aware of the impendency of political reform under such a situation. CPC has been ceaselessly exploring institutional improvements to fix up loopholes of obsolescent political structure from an overpast era. Looking at the explorations in the past two decades since the economic reform, we have gleefully observed trials in various fields and many of which are considered milestones of great symbolic significance.
“The system of checks and balances in western countries lies within the framework of multi-party system, while in China, where the CPC wields the scepter, this system is people’s congress”[ii] (Zhan Chengfu, 2005). In 2006, the NPC plenary session has passed
Moreover, during the process of this noteworthy transformation, government has given place to nongovernmental organizations in terms of administration on non-public affairs; civil society in China has been somewhat promoted on the whole. Notwithstanding the development of NGO remains slow, we can not deny the significance of these invigorative reforms and transformations.
GENERAL SITUATION OF GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY[1] IN CHINA
With the booming economic growth since past two decades, the modern westernized notion of “democracy”, transcending the traditional nation-state boarder, has been inevitably introduced to China. It has triggered domestic citizens’ awareness of their ignored rights and interests and hence bringing about scholarly discourse on this remained-elusive term. Government at central and local levels as well as scholars of institutions and NGOs has persistently sought for a set of frames that are globally identifiable nay locally acceptable in present China.
When we speak of “grassroots democracy” in contemporary China, it seems to serve as an important part in the process of exploration for political reform. It is instructive to look at the rural areas, with a huge amount of villages of 3,207,300[iii], are extensive experimental fields where a variety of innovative political reforms are fostered, developed and expanded.
DRIVING FORCE TO PROMOTE GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY IN CHINA（Li Fan,2006）[iv]
1. Local government to promote innovative forms of governance. 2. The masses to safeguard their rights
THE EVOLVEMENT OF THE SYSTEM IN VILLAGE AND TOWNSHIP
------From “Commune of People” to Township Regime
Local governance is of the essential components of the reform of the political structure in China, the crux of local governance by state power lies in villages and towns. As the foundation of central government power in villages, the power operation of local government with the carrier of local party organization is the junction point where the state power and social power interact.
The primarily set commune system has been exposed a series of loopholes in the actual operation. The conventional ways to overcome these shortcomings are mandatory political compulsion instead of economic measures, ceaseless expansion of class struggles and endless ideological infusion of “socialism” to peasants.
However, economy won’t always yield to politics. Earlier or later the economic evolvement will surmount political constraint and show up its characteristic of immovable by personal will. The society won’t be persistently under the control of an ill-adapted system; instead, it will compel the system to head towards a more compatible change. The cause of the change is rooted in the rural economy and social fact, the driving force of the change is again from the central CPC, the conductor of the change is still the local government.[v]
Oct, 1983, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China as well as the state council issued ”notification on split of administration from commune and the establishment of township government” which explicitly stipulates “the first priority is to separate administrative function from the commune and establish township government. Meanwhile establish township party committee consistent with town and establish economic organs based on production demand and the public’s will……as for the districts where agricultural cooperative associates are set up in a “natural village”, as long as local masses are willing to have function of a group of staff double as both economic organization and villagers’ committee, trial implementation is agreeable. “ Thus accomplished the transition from “integration of government administration with commune management” mode in the time of people’s commune and “centralized leadership” mode by revolutionary committee in the time of cultural revolution to “trinity” mode (combination of township government, township party committee and township economic organization) in the phase of the economic reform and opening.[vi]
Never before has the institutional innovation been so imperatively pushed on the schedule to get this situation resolved. CPC as the single governing party in current political system is the foremost power to promote institutional innovation. In fact, the success of the reform in towns itself improves the administrative competence of CPC and consolidates its governing foundation.
POLITICAL SUPERVISION ON PUBLIC BUDGET
According to Caiden Naomi, during the phase from 1949 to 1999, the fiscal resource allocation is determined by central plan; budget is nothing but the reflex of the plan. The public budget is not only lack of administrative control inside the government, but also lack of exterior political control. From 1999 the orientation-controlled budget system is established.
The feature during this phase is on one hand set up administrative control inside government, which implies the financial department is transformed to the “core budget institute”, on the other hand, people’s congress imposes exterior political control upon government to impel governmental budget to fulfill public responsibility. (Ma Jun, 2006)
Of all powers in the possession of modern congress, the power of examination, approval and supervision are the most essential parts. In the year of 1999, the standing committee of 9th National People’s congress has passed the
The power correlation among the party, people’s congress and government, subject to the institutional arrangement of unification of party and government, is not coordinated, thus results the weak enforcement of supervisory power. (Zhang Jianhong, 2006). The discrepancy between the process of policy formulation and budgeting leads to insufficient foresight of the budget.
The reform of public budget in our country should include political reform, in the process of budgeting; all social groupings could express their opinions and demands through deputies. In terms of China’s political development and economic advance, the time has come for initiating political reforms at local level, of course including technical reforms. It will have huge impact on whole of the budgetary reforms in China including political reforms in the future. (Li Fan, 2005)
A CASE STUDY OF “XINHE MODE”
Background of Wenling County[viii]
Wenling is a county-level city located in the southeast coastal area of the province of Zhejiang. It administers 11 townships including Zeguo, Daxi, Songmen, Ruoheng, Xinhe, Shitang, Binhai, Wenjiao, Chengnan、Shiqiaotou and Wugen. It’s one of the counties of highest population density across China. The integrated social-economic development index ranks 32nd of top 100 counties of the nation while its county-level economic competitiveness ranks 15th of top 100 counties of the nation. The first joint stock cooperative enterprise in mainland China was founded here.
A Brief Introduction to the Township of Xinhe[ix]
Xinhe town is under the administration of Wenling. It’s an main component of “Taizhou Delta” economic zone where lies the largest steel products trading market in eastern China (Tang xia) and a 4-A class national natural beauty scenic area (Chang yu dong tian).It has strong industrial economy, listed in the top 100 townships of Zhejiang province in the year of 2001.Also ranked 560th of the top 1000 townships in China.
Timetable:
1999 June, “democratic talkfest”[2] initiated in Songmen town in the city of Wenling, its prime form was “forum on construction of education on agricultural modernization in rural areas”, during which the convener set a section when the masses are encouraged to participate and express their own opinions, unexpectedly, the masses expressed great appreciation in it. Thus a group of farsighted local officials preserved this form and set it abroad to other townships. In the following years, different forms of “democratic talkfest” are applied to 7 townships under the administration of Wenling County.
2005 July, “democratic talkfest” first applied to public budget in the township of Xinhe, the details of the talkfest were designed by the propaganda department of Wenling party committee and the World and China Institute;[3]
Revision on budget was effected as a result of the implementation of “democratic talkfest”.
2006 March 6th, people’s congress of Xinhe town voted through < measures for implementation of ‘democratic talkfest’ in fiscal budget of Xinhe town (draft)>;
March 8th,
2007 Jan, fiscal budget has been passed without the session of “democratic talkfest”;
Feb, Jin Liangmin (secretary of the Party committee of Xinhe town) was promoted to director of the bureau of water resource of Wenling (Customarily the personnel in promotion will be replaced in his position before officially promoted.);[x]
April, “democratic talkfest” on < proposal on adjust the estimates of Xinhe town 2007> was set.
The Process of a “Democratic Talkfest”[xi]
Time: 2005 July 27th
Place: Town hall of Xinhe town
Attendee: 90 formal deputies to People’s congress; 190 common citizens plus a monk, a nun and a Taoist; 9 local government officials.
Process: Government officials sit face-to-face towards the deputies and public participants. Government officials respectively answer each interpellation of the masses on the issue of public budget. Like “is 1,600,000 Yuan too much for administrative cost? Why spend 700,000 on first coat for automobiles?” or “there are , m, any handicapped in our town, 300,000 Yuan transferred to charity sector is negligible, , is it possible to plunge more fund into this sector?”
Result: Based on the discussion in the democratic talkfest, the government convenes another session with the financial supervision group (consist of deputies to the People’s congress) on the public budget. And finally they make a amendment to the former budgeting plan.
Items Revised Due to “Democratic Talkfest”[4]
Following are the items revised in an aftermath of implementation of democratic talkfest in public budget from 2005 to 2007 according to released documents.
2005
2006:
-250,000
Totality
2007
Significance
The three-year-long implementation of the combination of “democratic talkfest” and public fiscal budget in Xinhe town has yet to be proved perfectly feasible solution of problems encountered in the process of public budgeting; nevertheless its profound implication has reached beyond the practical function.
1. The democratic talkfest between local government officials and the deputies to the people’s congress and the mass is essentially an embodiment of public opinion. From the released records of democratic talkfest sessions we can find out that villagers have participated in the talk and indeed expressed their own opinions on the budget. 2. Is it true that more public participation will impact upon fiscal budget? It puzzles us until we accomplished the summary of the items revised due to “democratic talkfest”. Now we find out convincing data to support earlier assumption:
3. Government behavior has been restrained. Since the standing committee of people’s congress is not established at the township level, local government usually makes important decisions relating to townee’s livelihood (of course, supposed to be voted through by the people’s congress) legally unwarranted. The implementation of “democratic talkfest” in public budget has put the government under public scrutiny. Therefore the government is “compelled” to take every tiny detail into account while making items in public budget.
Problem
In terms of the application of “democratic talkfest” to the public budget, there are some particular problems to be solved in the process.
From the documents released, we can see that the deputies to the people’s congress (say nothing of the common townees) are lack of sufficient professional knowledge. So the presidium of local people’s congress set a training course few days before the talkfest. The courses including brief introduction of public budget, technical details of budgetary drafting, practical rights of people’s congress and why public should participate.[xii] Xinhe town is one of the wealthiest towns in mainland China, if we assume the economic development is closely related to educational level; it’s deducible that the fact is the townees in China, pessimistic to say, on the whole, are illiterate in these areas.
Another thing is, the talkfest is actually vulnerable, although the < Measures for implementation of ‘democratic talkfest’ in fiscal budget of Xinhe town (draft)> has been voted through and stipulations have been made on details in four sections of the process: preliminary democratic talkfest on budget report, democratic talkfest on budget in People’s congress, revision and approval of the budget report, budget enforcement and supervision, the institution is not set up to confirm its annual implementation however. So no wonder in 2007, when the former official (also during his term, the democratic talkfest is initiated) was promoted to county, the plenary meet of people’s congress launched without talkfest.
CONCLUSION
The “democratic trial” in Xinhe town has interested political academia. “The Xinhe trial is a socialistically democratic innovation with Chinese local characteristics, it’s a brand new governing mode developed from the original attention to solve problems recently exposed… Xinhe case is typically a Chinese public budget reform, representing future orientation of public finance budget in our country.”[xiii] (Ma Jun, 2006) “democratic experiment” in Xinhe has been endowed with significance of great importance to the people’s congress, as it realizes to function as supervisor on public budget, actor of local organs of state power and monitor of representative body on governmental fiscal budget.
However, we can not expect too much of the extent to which the function of the people’s congress is exercised in present political power structure with CPC as the sole governing party in this specific political frame. As a matter of fact, the support (at least recognition) of the party committee is essential for people’s congress to wield power. Rather than simply applauding for the “temporal” realization of the function of people’s congress, our intent is to focus on how to institutionalize the “support of party committee” by dint of structural readjustment of political power structure. This is a compromising yet practical option to deepening political reform in China. Only in this new institutional background can the extension of “Xinhe mode” in the field of public fiscal reform be theoretically feasible to regions at corresponding, even higher level.
As broadly observed, the role of local party committee as well as officials related to party affairs is of great importance for the duration of the ongoing functional transformation of local government in China. In the “democratic talkfest” case, the behind leading force is the party committee of Wenling city and its subordinating township party committee.[xiv]We can deduce from the events in the timetable the democratic talkfest was initially set as an activity through which the party committee carry on ideological and political work with the arrangement of putting the “democratic talkfest office” affiliated to propaganda department of the city party committee. “As the party in power, the transformation of administrative mode of CPC is inclusive of the way to promote the administrative competence.”(Chen Yimin, 2005). [xv]
In Xinhe case, improvement of administrative competence of the party is exactly expressed in its support as a main force to encourage the people’s congress to wield examination power on executive decision. That the supervision on administrative acts as well as realization of political intention via people’s congress maintains both CPC’s influence and the authority of people’s congress as an organ of state power as well.
That Xinhe County is the cradle of “participatory budget reform” should primarily owe to the support of former secretary of the party committee. An interesting fact to shore up previous assumption is that when Jin Liangmin has later been promoted from secretary of party committee to Wenling bureau of water resource, his successor hurriedly convoked plenary session of the people’s congress without convening “democratic talkfest” for the fiscal budget. Hence, to ensure the execution of the reform on participatory democracy not aborted or weakened insomuch as the alternation of individual will, it has to be institutionalized.[xvi]Obviously the party committee still plays an absolutely d, omi, nant role in grassroots democracy, which tallies with present political power structure. How to s, tabilize the party’s support for people’s congress by institutionalizing the occasionally enlightened leadership? We believe the current large-scale-operation of “double as both secretary of local party committee and director of people’s congress standing committee at the same level”[7] is a valuable trial to reorganize state power structure and reasonably “band together” the leadership and governing power of the party with legislative power and supervisory power of the people’s congress.
Recently, the sign of diminishing returns emerges in the “construction on legality of political achievement”. The present reform on budget has positioned government disposal of income and expense under the supervision of people’s congress, consequently brings government budget under control from exterior. Thereby government is propelled to fulfill its public obligation, which consolidates the legitimacy of the government. Apparently, in the meantime it strengthens the status of the people’s congress as highest organ of state power by means of reinforcing its function in supervision and power on decision-making
The status in quo of currently applied budgetary reform has influenced the political process to a certain extent. However, the political structure remains untouched; this is why the result of current reform is dissatisfactory. In most of the carried-out experimental budgetary reform, the effort to achieve a mutually beneficial situation between the people’s congress and CPC is fallaciously proved in vain. Digging into the political structure, we believe the failure for people’s congress to wield power should be eventually ascribed to the approach through which the governing party carries out power; lack of participation of the party committee and guidance on the people’s congress in its substantive control of on government budget. Obviously, the people’s congress can hardly develop to an influential force to interact and balance the government unless it acquired the support of the Party committee.
The present situation tells us that to realize budgetary reform in terms of modern democratic politics requires reform at the core bottom, such as the power structure and decision-making methods, the fact is, public budget reform indeed involves political power structure and the power correlation. NPC can not veritably exercise political supervision on public budget under present political power pattern. Installation of modern pubic budget mechanism requires for reorganization of political power structure, namely, the political structural reform.
Simply endowing the people’s congress with the rights of examination and supervision yet without reformation of current political structure and establishment of a systematic and normative institution will undoubtedly foredoom the failure of reforms whatsoever.
Owing to the difference of political party systems between China and the west, CPC is not obliged to achieve political intention by means of congress. Since CPC is in possession of exclusively dominating status, the only way for people’s congress to supervise the government is based on party committee’s authority.
Therefore, to carry out effective supervision on government by people’s congress under present China’s political structure should depend on authority and support of CPC. The formation of execution power of people’s congress is equivalent to the realization of party’s authority.
Considering the specific situation of China, the ideal breakthrough for CPC to transform from a revolutionary party to a governing party is to explore the role of the governing party in the government and people’s congress.
The 3rd plenary meeting of 16th NPC has passed through
Present design and some local experimental units have drawn the outline of an innovative institutional framework. “Double as both local secretary of the Party committee and director of people’s congress at the same level” is one of them.
Improvement of party committee’s guidance on people’s congress is a feasible breakthrough towards further socialistic democratization. The above-mentioned institutional innovation is in a sense a threshold of further tentation in achieving doable ways for CPC to carry out political activities by dint of experiences of modern party politics. In this way CPC not just successfully carry out political activities within the range of constitution, but also ensure the power of people’s congress, which stabilizes its status in the official rhetoric an “organ of supreme power”.
What is more, such a political structural reform is featured with stability and maneuverability as it has kept the headship of the party. Within this power framework, the leadership of CPC integrates with legislative power and supervisory power of people’s congress. Consequently the practice of laws and regulations formulated by people’s congress is substantially operation of the party’s policy. Thus the relation among political party, people’s congress and government is arranged in order. On the other hand, the embarrassing situation in which government confronts “dual leadership” is no longer existed.
As the relevance I drew out above, CPC should make the best of the ideal power carrier of people’s congress and regard the integration of power in the form of “double as local secretary of party committee and director of the people’s congress at the corresponding level” as an opportunity. Gradually the party and people’s congress is achieving organizational integration and power amalgamation. Only when the new power structure is established, can political supervision on public budget by the people’s congress virtually realized.
APPENDIX[8]
[1].Definition of “grassroots democracy”: from the vertical perspective, Grassroots not simply equals to townships, besides which there are “the masses organization of self-government” (qunzhongxing zizhi zuzhi) of villager’s committee (cunmin weiyuanhui) and urban residents’ committee (jumin weiyuanhui), and towns, districts of municipality, city without districts. From the horizontal perspective, grassroots not only refers to regime only, but also various government agencies, public organizations (shehui tuanti), and public institutions (shiye danwei)
[i] HUANG, JI. (2006), “From the Significance and Failure of the Cultural Revolution”, via: http://www.360doc.com/showweb/0/0/499385.aspx , last access: 2007-4-25
[ii]WANG, B.Y. (2007), “Why the First Village committee in China Initiated by Guangxi Peasant is Rarely Known? Dialogue with Zhan Chengfu, Director-General of Grassroots regime and Community Construction Department of Ministry of Civil Affairs.” , via: http://blog.sina.com.cn/u/563dbf410100093e, last access: 2007-5-5
[iii] According to http://www.baoob.com/12/1/455677.html, last access: 2007-5-24
[iv] LI, FAN. (2005) “Development of Grassroots Democracy in China and Its Legal Reform”, Background and Analysis, Vol.124.
[v] ZHANG, L.T. (1996) “Goodbye to Ideality----Research on People’s Commune System” (Shanghai, Oriental Publishing Centre), 447.
[vii] YUAN, F.C. (2002) “Village Relation and Village Democracy---Overview on [viii] According to http://www.wl.gov.cn/, last access: 2007-5-12
[ix] According to http://xinhe.wlnw.gov.cn/asp/Top_Get.asp?GetID=0, last access: 2007-4-29
[x]According to official website of Wenling People’s Congress, via http://www.wlrd.gov.cn/show.asp?sid=933, last access: 2007-5-9
[xiii] HU, N.F.(2006), “Zhejiang Wenling: Democratic Talkfest Causes Public Budgeting”, South Weekend, 2006, March 16th , Nanfang Daily Press Group.
[xiv] HE, J.ZH. (2007), “The Exploration of Democratic Tools and Improvement of Administrative Competence----A Perspective to Analyze Democratic Talkfest in Wenling”, Background and Analyze, Vol.129.
[xv] CHEN, Y.M. (2005), “Wenling Democratic Talkfest: Searching for Space for Democratic Politics”, Decision-Making, Vol.11, pp.32-33
[xvi] DENG, Y.W.(2007), “Avoid Democratic Talkfest on Budget Depending on People by Institutionalization”, China Youth Daily, 2007, April 13th, via: www.ycwb.com/sp/2007-04/13/content_144829, last access: 2007,5,8
Tracing back to decade, we can find these remarkable milestones regardless of their actual results:
1998 Buyun town under the administration of the prefecture level city of Suining, Sichuan Province. First time in China the direct election is applied at township level government. With the help of the designers from the World and China institute, an NGO dedicates to political studies. However, this direct election is controversial, some people criticize it as “unconstitutional” since it has been stipulated in relevant electoral law that direct election is only allowed in the election for deputies to the People’s congress and, head of township is voted by deputies to People’s congress.
2004 Direct election held in seven towns under the administration of Shiping county, Honghe autonomous prefecture of Yunnan province. This is at largest scale in China the direct election is applied to township level government official.
2007 in the city of Tianjin, 196 residents of a community (Xinhe garden) in the name of constituencies jointly signed a proposal on the recall of the board chairman of the developer of their community from his position of deputy to people’s congress. Because of his sluggishness with respect to fulfillment of the contract with residents. Although the removal procedure has not yet started, however, it has evoked strong public response and received extensive media attention.
In the 1980’s, the household contract responsibility system with remuneration linked to output is extensively implemented in rural areas of China, however, the official of the people’s commune who originally propelled the reform soon realized the reform has moved away the basis of commune itself. The “production team” gradually failed to organize peasants’ production, so does the commune have to give orders to agricultural production.
Many scholars have made study of the current situation and the roots of the conflict in the town-village relationship. The town-village relationship depends on the relation between the state and rural society; the formation is effected and constrained by multiple factors, but mainly by the political system and financial aspect.[vii] The exacerbation of the conflict in the town-village relationship derives from three aspects: the deficiency in the supply of normative system; the status of township government in the state power structure and its functional positioning as well as village committee’s unbalance of serving as both villagers’ autonomous organization and actual administrative organization in power. In the present reform taken in towns, the establishment of institutions is seriously lagged.
“We have so many handicapped in town; 300,000 Yuan can barely solve the problem. We should append fund on charity”
------Wu Xiaoju
“Why do you spend 700,000 Yuan on government vehicle procurement? Is it possible to reduce expenses on this part?”
------Chen Yuanfang[6]
2005
Outlay for philanthropy has got an increase of 200,000 Yuan, since a deputy asserted the fund in draft budget is insufficient to meet the needs of current situation.
2006
A. Of the entire increased fund (1,250,000 RMB), 100,000 RMB is related to governmental administration cost, which accounts for only 8% of totality. While 92% of the total increased fund is related to public service.
B. One detail calls us attention is the amendment to the fund for public education expenditure, which consists of three items. The first two reduced items are “student dormitory construction” and “schoolhouse maintenance”, both of which are related to Chang Yu middle school; the last item that obtains increase in fund is entitled with “Tang Xia Pian middle school construction”.
2007
The scale of amendments in this year seems comparably smaller than last two year. With an increase in only one item which is still related to public relief subsidy.
From above we can see an incline of fund towards public sector. Moreover, due to the lack of first-hand investigation and deep-going understanding, fund distribution is always blind; however it has been satisfactorily balanced. According to “2006, B”, we can see a budgetary fund of 440,000 Yuan has been evenly “transferred” from Chang Yu middle school to Tang Xia Pian school as a result of participation of those who are aware of the factual situation, thus they have got a common sense that Chang Yu middle school has already received considerable fund last year while its counterpart in neighboring region is lack of sufficient fund.
,